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IN the not’.so4istant past, the United States’ agri-
cultural price-supportprograms provided an incentive
for the production of bountiful harvests and huge
amounts of surplus foods. In response, the U.S. gov-
ernment developed a variety of programs to reduce
these surpluses by selling them abroad at sharply re-
duced prices to less developed countries. The sales of
“cheap” food for nonconvertible currencies and the
ways in which the receipts were used in the various
countrieshave generated considerable discussion and
controversy among economists.
Although the sales offoodfor these currencieswere
initiatedinthe early1950s andhadbeenphasedout by
the early 1970s, a brief review of the impact of this
programis timelyfor atleasttwo reasons: (1) payments
generatedby it, called counterparthinds, stillexistand
have had important consequences long after thepro-
gram itselfhasbeenphased out; and (2) it appearsthat
the United States,once again, isfacing ever-increasing
fltrm surpluses. Beforedecisions are madeto “reduce”
these surpluses,itwould be useful to assess the impact
ofthepriorprogramson boththeUnited Statesandthe
beneficiaries. This articledoes not attempt an exhaus-
five surveyofthepriorprograms. Instead, it focuses on
the arguments usedto establishthe counterpart funds
program and its impacts.
Surplus Food and Counterpart Funds
The Agricultural Trade Development and Assis-
tance Act of 1954 (P.L. 480), designed to increase
exports of U.S. “surplus” farm products to less de-
veloped countries(LDCs), led to the creation ofcoun-
terpart hinds. These funds arenonconvertible curren-
cies offoreign nations credited to the United States in
payment forshipmentsofthe surplusagricultural com-
modities. The uses thatcan be madeoftheaccounts are
highly restricted — largely limited to U.S. embassy
expenses, market development, common defenseand
economic development in the respective LDCs.
Source ofthe Accounts
UnderP. L. 480, the United Statessellssurplus Farm
commodities to friendly LDCs in exchange for foreign
currencies. Inthese negotiationsauthorized underthe
act, the President is required to ensure, insofar as
practicable, that such sales do not replace the normal
sales of the same products by the United States or
other friendly nations.’ This requirement, in effect,
limited P.L. 480 shipments to nations that had rel-
atively small amounts of foreign exchange (gold or
convertible currency).
With minor exceptions, foreign currenciesobtained
from the export of these farm commodity surpluses
initially weredeposited in U.S. accounts in the central
banks ofthe importing countries and could, with few
exceptions, be spent only in these countries. As the
currencies were used, they were withdrawn from the
central bank accounts. The Commodity Credit Cor-
poration (CCC), an agency ofthe U.S. Departmentof
Agriculture, is responsible for financing the sale and
exportofthe commodities. AnyU.S. agencythat hinds
its foreign activities by drawing on this account must
reimburse the CCC.
The Food for Peace Actof 1966 alteredthe arrange-
ments under P.L. 480 by requiring that most food
shipmentswould be soldfor dollars, instead offoreign
currencies, with the transition to be completed by the
end of1971.2 As a resultofthis policy change, sales of
form products for foreign currencies, which reached a
peak of $1.7 billion in 1963, were phased out in the
early 1970s.~ Because a sizable portion ofthe $18 bil-
Theauthorwislaesto acknowledgethehelpful commentsreceived on
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Table 1
Uses of Foreign Currency Provided in Title I, P.L. 480
Shipments, July 1, 1954, through September 30, 1980
(amounts in millions of dollars)
All Counirios nd.a
Peeceit 2er.:ent
Amount d:stributinn An~oe:nt o.stribution
cornrnor. aetense S 2.18/ 14’~ S ‘3
Loans ‘o private ente’prse 413 3 2b4 6
Grants for economIc deve:opmeri: 1.838 ~1 696 7
loans to forc’qn governments 5.157 32 2.494 61
Population growth programs 64 0 32 1
Control of rodents. insects etc 22 0
Loans and grants 2 204 14
US uses ±12.~ _?6 599 IS
TOTAL 515.968 100% 54,07? 100°c
‘1954 to 1973 only
SOURCES U.S Dop~r1ment of Agriculture Food fo’ P~ace 1980Annual Report on Public law 480.
taple 14 and 1.973 Annual R~port on Puohc law 480 tab e 13
lion in counterpart funds obtained during the 1955—74 or threatened species. The Environmental Protect vu
period was not spent directly, but loaned to both gov- Agencyuses the funds to support research in anumber
ernment and private enterprises in the food-importing of countries ostensibly for developing standards and
nations, it continued to be made available through regulations applicable to the United States.°
principal and interest payments on these loans. The
counterpart hind balances held by the U.S. Treasury U.S. officials concede that many of these overseas
and other executive agencies of the government programs exist solely because the foreign currencies
totaled $1.1 billion on September 30, 1980.~ are available. For example, the U.S. Department of
Labor uses some of the Indian currency for yearly
meetings of government officials and labor attaches
from various embassies. Robert Greenberger of the
Wall Street Journal quoted one official who attended
the 1982 meeting in New Delhi as saying, “The annual
gatherings are important because things are moving
List in the international labor world.” Despite this
hectic pace, the U.S. Department of Lahor issued no
written report “because we didn’t think it was
needed .. .besides if we had [written one] it would
have been classified.” Furthermore, becauseinflation
in the various countries reduces the valueofthe funds
each succeeding year, there is additional incentive to
accelerate the rate ofspending of these funds, regard-
less of the use derived!’
fLsos o tL~:~ J.?.n~/3(
The uses of the foreign currencies provided by the
P.L. 480 agreements since 1954 are shown in table 1.
Grants for economicdevelopment and loans to foreign
governments, also largely for economic development,
accounted for44 percent ofthe total. Common defense
and loans and grants to others accounted for 14 percent
each, and U.S. uses accounted for 26 percent.
Authorized U.S. uses fur the hinds included de-
veloping new markets for U.S. farm commodities, sci-
entific, cultural and educational programs, sales of
such currencies to U.S. organizations andcitizens, and
paying U.S. obligations abroad (table 2). The National
Park Service has used the currencies to develop and
manage programs for the conservation of endangered
‘Annual Report ofthe Secretary oft/ic Treasury on the State aft/re
Finances, Statistical Appendix. (GPO, 1981), F’iscal Year 1980, p.
431.
‘U S Department of Agriculture, Food for Peace: 1980 Annual
Report on Public Law 480.
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Theodore Schultz, in a classic critique of the pro-
gram in 1960, estimated that actual payments to the
United States for shipments under tIns program would
be between 10-15 cents per dollar of CCC costs.7 A
more optimistic view was presented by McGehee
Spears and Dale Vining of the USDA Foreign Agri-
cultural Service, who found the program a net gener-
ator of foreign exchange, noting: “Programs which
generate needed foreign exchange without dollar
purchase of snch exchange, take on added, and posi-
tive, importance;” this implies that the currencies are
valuable assets to the United States.8 Without making
specificjudgments about the value of the funds to the
United States, Spears later concluded: (1) “ ... for-
eign currencies acquired through the sale of surplus
agricultural commodities are utilized advantageously
in financing part ofU.S. government military andeco-
nomic assistance operations abroad;” and (2) the sub-
stitution by the United States offoreign currencies for
dollar expenditures abroad prevented the overall
balance-of-payments deficit from risinghigher— that
is, constituted real payments to the United States.°
A numberofwriters have pointed to the opportuni-
ties for using counterpart funds to finance economic
development programs in the food importing nations.
S. R. Sen, in reply to Schultz’s criticism of the pro-
gram, fonnd that in India“the use that has been made
of the counterpart funds in building up the infrastruc-
ture of the economy, in constructing irrigation and
power facilities, improving transport and communica-
tions andpromotingresearch and extension is certainly
noteworthy.”°B. 0. Olson reported” ... the ben-
efit (from use ofthe funds) depends on the extent to
which the recipient country takes advantage of the
presenceofthese goods [foodshipments] to stepup the
pace of development. It can do this with created
money ‘~ In support of the program, Deena
Khatkhate reported that the food shipments provided
an important source of funds for investment in the
public sector of India. 12
Earl Heady and John Timmons in 1967, after point-
ing out the long-run impact of food aid on thepopula-
tion/food production ratio of P. L. 480 importing na-
tions, reported individual elements ofthe program
for example, some uses of counterpart funds — to be
positive. They pointed to the program’s impact in
Israel as an exampleof the gains that can be achieved
from the investmentofsuch funds. Two methods were
enumerated by which these fundsassist capitalinvest-
ment: “First, funds which would go into food pur-
chases abroad at unfavorable rates ofexchange become
available for investment within the country. Second,
under Title I of Public Law 480, local currencies be-
come available for internal developmental in-
vestment.”13
The debate on the value ofthe funds to the United
States subsided somewhat with the phase-out of farm
product exports for such currencies in theearly 1970s.
Their use, however, continues to attract the attention
ofthe daily press. t1 Furthermore, in its annual report,
Foodfor Peace, the USDA lists the uses made of the
hinds under a numberof headings: export market de-
velopment; market and utilization research; scientific,
medical, cultural and educational activities; and build-
ings for the U.S. governmentJ°
(~/.bL I. to 110.0 t•ra 0totes
Some of the confusion about the value of the pay-
ments to the United States for the food can be elimi-
nated by comparing the real value of the funds to the
United States to the resources given up by food-
importing nations that receive the food. The value of
the funds tothe United States is approximately the real
saving to the U.S. government resulting from their
expenditure. The actual expenditure of the funds for
U.S. uses is shown in table 2. The real saving to the
7
TheodoreW. Schultz, ‘Valueof U.S. Farm Surpluses toUnderde-
veloped Countries,” Journal of Fann Economics (December
1960), pp. 1019—30.
5
McGehee H. Spears and Dale K.Vining, ImportanceofLI. S. Farm
Exports to Balance of Payments, United States Department of
Agriculture, Economic Reporting Service and Foreign Agricultur-
al Service, Foreign Agriculture Economic Report No. 7, October
1962.
°McGeheeH. Spears. “RecordingP.L. 480Transactions in the U.S.
Balance ofPayments,” Southern Economic Journal (April 1963),
pp. 340-45.
iO~ R. Sen, “Impact and Implications of Foreign Surplus Disposal
on Underdeveloped Economies—The Indian Perspective, Jour-
nal of Farm Economics (December 1960), pp. 1031—42,
“R. 0. Olson, “Discussion: Impact and Implications of Foreign
14
Surplus Disposal on Underdeveloped Economies,’ Journal of
Farm Economics (December 1960), pp. 1042—45.
‘2Deena H. Khatkhate, “Some Notes on the Real Effects ofForeign
Surplus Disposal in Underdeveloped Economies,” Quarterly
Journal of Economics (May 1962), pp. 186—96.
‘
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United States resulting from their usage, however, is
well below the indicated dollar expenditure figure.
U.S. expenditures in the P,L. 480 food importing
countries would have been much less had there been
no foreign currency holdings; indeed, many of the
expenditureswould have never been made had outlays
of dollars been necessary. 16
A number of programs, such as trade fairs; agricul-
tural market developments; health, education and
welfare; cultural exchange activities; and American-
sponsored schools, studies and conferences are associ-
ated closely withthe P. L. 480Act As indicated in table
2, about one-third of the U.S. counterpart fund ex-
penditures in all the participating nations through
September 1979 was of this type. Without the funds,
these programs would have been carried out on a
greatly reduced scale, if indeed at all. Consequently,
the real value to the United States of using foreign
currency was well below the 26 percent of the total
disbursed for U.S. uses. Since the counterpart funds
credited to the United States covered only about 90
percent of the CCC outlays for the farm products ex-
ported, the actual recovery ofCCC investment in the
food was probably on the low sideofthe Schultz 10—15
percent estimate.
Food shi.7nne•ntt’ Large/i a. ;•.~.
Since the food-importing nations reimbursed the
United States for only about 10 percent ofthe original
CCC investment infood, about 90 percent ofthe ship-
ments were essentially a gift by the United States to
the recipient nations. Agift ofgoods from onenation to
another, however, is not neutral with respect to eco-
nomic activity in either country. In this case, the poli-
cies that led to thegift caused increases in taxes, inthe
price ofgrain to producers, and in the price of food in
the donor nation. The higher price of grain, in turn,
provided incentive for farmers to purchase more re-
sources and increase production, further increasing
supplies in future years.
Moreover, the gift exacerbates the long-run food
production problem in the recipient nations.’’ While
consumers may pay less for food as the supply in-
10
Greenherger, “It MaySurprise You;”and Jimmye S. Hillman and
Murray R. Benedict, “AFurther Look atP.L. 480 andthe Balance




Theanalysis here is intended to describethe effects ofprograms
designed to reduce farm “surpluses.” It does not necessarily de-
scribe the efticts of humanitarian distributions offood and other
aid intended to alleviate the short-run impacts ofcrop failures and
other natural disasters.
creases, domesticfarmers are subjected tofurtherfood
price declines. The lower price reduces food produc-
tion, thereby leading to less domestic food output in
future years. hence, these gifts contribute to further
rural poverty in the recipient nations.18
The cost of the grain to the importing nations,
although relatively small, has some impact on their
balance-of-payments. It reduces their foreign ex-
change earnings to the extent that they would have
received dollar exchange for the U.S. embassy ex-
pense, thereby reducing their ability topurchase other
goods and services from abroad. Moreover, U.S. ex-
penditures offunds that would not have been made in
the absence of the accounts also are real costs to the
importing countries. Resources used in these coun-
tries by the United States for trade fairs, agricultural
market developmnents, education, etc., are costs in
terms of scarce goods and services. The use of these
goods and services, while often looked upon as costless
from theviewpoint ofthe U.S. users, are areal expense
tothe food importing nations. Hence, theywillconsid-
er such expenses an important factor in negotiating
P.L. 480 agreements and currency use projects.
Funds not used directly by the United States but
credited to its account were disbursed for projects
designed to benefit these less-developed nations.
Funds, grants and loans were released for these pur-
poses through agreements with their governments.
Such grants and loansthrough 1980 totaled about $13
billion or 75 percent ofall foreign currencies credited
to the United States in payment for Title I food ship-
ments (table 1). This amount, plus the excess of CCC
outlays for the shipments not credited to the United
States, plus a portion of the U.S. uses of the funds
represents the cost of this program to U.S. taxpayers
that is not reimbursed by foreign governments.
The approximate real values exchanged in the P.L.
480, Title I, transactions may be summarized as fol-
lows:
United States






The value ofthe grain to the United States and the
receiving nations is assumed to be 100 percent of the
‘°Forfurtherdiscussion, see Dale W. Adams and DonaldW. Lar-
son, “What Cheap Food Doesto Poor Countries,” The Wall Street
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world market value fOr grain. Because the real valueof
the payment received by theUnited States is ahout 10
percent ofthe value ofthegrain shipments, thenet loss
to the United States totaled approximately 90 percent
of the market value of the exports. The real cost of the
grain to the recipient nations, however, totaled about
26 percent of the value of the shipments, amid the net
gain (value of the gift) to the recipients totaled 74
percent of the market value of the grain. The transac-
tions resulted in a ‘‘welfhreloss” ofabout 16 percent of
the combined value of the shipments; in other words,
real payments to the United States were abotit 16
percentofthe market valueofthe grain below the real
costs to the recipients. A case study ofthe portion of
the P.L. 480program that generated the hindsin India
indicatesthe realeconomicimpacts ofthe transactions.
IINi) 1.A : A CASE.STE’iJ.DY
For two reasons, India is used to demonstrate the
real impact oftbe P. L. 480 transactions thatgenerated
the counterpart funds. First, India has signed more
agreements for Title 1, P. L. 480 shipments than any
other nation — $6.1 billion, or about 40 percent ofthe
total at the close of 1980. Second, although there is a
paucity of data for all the recipient nations, more data
are available for India that for other nations.
Crea.tion of Co-nnterpart Funds’ In Fart.
a I I2r~es-nn-.cnttoe/st i%:Ion,ttttza.tion. t’T’aC (i5’5
As indicated in figure 1, the government of India
obtained funds fOrP. L. 480 shipments by selling secur—
sties to the Reserve Bank of India. ‘ Proceeds from the
security sales svere then credited by the bank to the
Indian government (stage A, figure 1). Upon arrival of
the fOod shipments, the funds were credited to the
U.S. Treasury (stage B). These accounts were left on
deposit with the reserve bank until disbursements
were made in the form of loans and grants to India or
forother uses as previously outlined. As the funds were
disbursed, ownership was transferred to the private
sector, and they eventually were credited to member
bank accounts at the reserve hank, thereby increasing
commercial bank reserves and the stock of money
(stage C). Ifthe process stopped at this point, all coun-
terpart funds would he monetized following disburse—
mnent. The Indian government, however, recovered
part ofthe funds from the public through grain sales at
9
Deena H. Khatkhate, “Money Supply Impact of NatitnialCurren-
cy Counterpart ofForeign Aid; An Indian Case.” The Renew ~/‘
Economies and Stotisties iFebruary 1963). pp. 78—83.
Reserves fOr monetary expansion, thus, were in-
creased only’ to the extent of the subsidy. Because the
entire cost of P. L. 480 food imports was financed in-
itially- by’ government borrowings from the reserve
hank, the excess ofcosts over proceeds from fOod sales
remained in the banking system as an addition to re—
serves at the central hank after the counterpart hinds
has been disbursed (stage E, last entry). With an esti-
mated .50 percent of counterpart hinds resulting from
the central bank’s financing ofgovernment deficits, the
impact of such expenditures on hank reserves (high—
powered money) was quite large. For example, by’
1980, agreements had been made for the use of more
. -5)
than $4 hmlhon in counterpart funds in India. — On the
basis ofthe estimated rate ofsubsidy on the food sales,
this added more than $2 billion (rupee equivalent) to
hank reserves.
India has a relatively high ratio of currency’ to de-
posit money and the impact of increased reserves on
the stock of money (currency plus demand deposits) in
recent years has been relatively low — about one to
one. Nevertheless, the addition of an estimated $200
million in reserves in 1967 as a result of P. L. 480
operations caused a rise of ahotit 3 percent in the
money stock, which was about one—third the average
rate of annual money growth from 1965 to 1970. On
tIns basis. the expenditure of counterpart funds
accounted fOr about one—third ofthe 6.4 percent rate of
inflation during the’ half decade. The addition of $2
billion over a 2.5—year period, thus, was a sO’ahle factor
contributing to the rise in the money stock and the
relatively high inflation rate. 2!
Creat/or~a;tfoan.nrrs;-art r’<i. ~__~ ~,
a FLea! i~y’..-fl-c~t~’”;
Partial recovery of the funds occurred when the
government sold the imported food to the public and
less than cost, partially’
serves. Consequently,
the sales remained on
ofisetting the rise in hank re—
only the subsidized portion of
the central hank’s hooks.
20US Department ofAgriculture. Food/tr Peace, 1980, table t3.
21
Duriug the three “ears from 1964—65 to 1966—67, inclusive, the
net Reserve Bank of ludia credit to the government and private
sectors ruse Rs. 1,401 erores, while the stock of money rose Rs.
201 erores
Typical of less—developed nations, eorrencv in India is a snore
desirableform ofinoisee than densanddeposits. %%‘lst-si curre ncv is
withdrawn fi-om the banking system, it reduces bankresen~esata
one—to—one ratio. In contrast. in the absence oflarge enri-c ncv
withdrawals, demand depositsca’s he expandccl at some inultiple
of new rc’senes. depending on legal m’esc’m’ve req‘siren sc’nts
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FIgure 1
How Counterpart Funds Increase the Stock of Money in India
(amounts in millions of dollars)
Stage A StageD
Governmentsells bonds to cen rat bank t obtain $500 million to Government sellsgrain o public at 50 percentofcostand reduces
pay United States for grain, debt to central bank with proceeds
Central Ban Balance Sheet Central Bank Balance Sheet
Assets Liabilities Assets L,abslmtes
Cove nment bonds $500 Government deposits $500 No change Commercial bankdeposits $250
Government deposits $250
Stage B
Government pays United Statesforgrain Conime cial Bank Balance Sheet
Central Bank Balance Shee Assets rabilitmes
A sets Liabilities Legal reserves $250 Demand deposit $250
No change Government deposits $500
U S deposits $500
Stage c Stage 1?
UnitedStatesspends depositssn Indiaf rdevelopment purposes Government reduces bonded debt to central bank
Central Bank Balance Sheet Central Bank Balance Sheet
Assets Liabilitie Assets Liabilities
No change Li S deposits $500 Government bonds $250 Government deposits $250
Commercial ban deposits $500
Commercial Bank Balance Sheet Central Bank (FINAL) Balance Sheet
Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities
Legal reserves $500 Demand deposits $500 (money) Government bond $250 Commercial bank deposits $250
paid oH’ ‘ipos tion ofits debt to the res ~rs c hank( tages In the Cos cr1 ment to it duec gi adualh thetie snent of
D anti L hgum e 1) If the cit posits xx e made simtil . uhsidv
taneouslx xx ith the dishui se nents md if the ckpossts The portion of eotint rpai-t funds that xx as ofiset by
x crc equal to the d’shm rsemc nts the fund xs-ould sales offoocl tothe public (funds ax ‘uhahlc for r duetion
has e’ had no impact on the tock of mones The pro— of go’ c nnn nt cli ht to the Rescrs e Bank of India) had
ceeds fo msales of P. L. 480 food to the Indian public no impact on the hexci of hank rests x es or the stock of
hossext r did not equal the rupee credits to the United mones ‘I his portli ml sx-as essenti’ihhx a fiscal )peration.
Stat s The extent ofthe silo tage is not ax aihahie hut Food largels don’ited in the United States to the
rough c sti nates mdicate that no more than 50 pc scent Indian gox ems 1 nt xx ts used as a inc ‘ins of ti~ul ft i -
of P. L. 480 xx he at cost vxas recoscreel in somc sears isn~ it sow cc sli ow the pi i ‘ste totile’ public sec’toi .
(. tage F). 2 For example the Re s rv c Bank of Indi’ indicated bx Cams Seekers pioceeds from thesc sale
repo ted that the is mu price of imported xx he at xx ‘is may he’ xi xx c ci asan mdii ec’t t tx on Indian fhrmers md
‘used from 50 to o5 rupee per qc intal on Noxember a suh nh to eonstsme’rs bee inst the producing si etor
lo 1966 ..ill accordance xx ith the decision tiken uflei e’d fiow loxx a piicc’s and the consume i seetoi
benefited from losses cost food. 74
2
’Ihs stun it s hi ccl on the issue puce if 40 II per quint il
— -. Resc ‘xc B ink of mis, R port n Curr ncij and I Inane foi the bout ‘1 80 per liii hc I) intl St i per bushel ix ci,’’ cost at , — letim /966—6 Bombix 196,
Ansinc in ports Octan frii’ ht i cshni steel it ¶0 4., pci hush I
,nsd sluppm antI elmstri histmoii cost in Inch a at 04 0pe i hiisIs I ~(, irs L Sc x c m s ‘An Lx sIns tson of thc I)in sic ‘ii ti’. & Fife et
The rex ,ulsn ‘ cxc h.sng rt cof 13 3 ‘c nh pci rnp e xx is iss 3i n ( aus c
1
Iv. I L 480 Slnpsnc its Aneric’”, Jon riiai of I ci ‘is/tar
the iL ul its is’ sit Fe otioohse sç Au ust 196%). pp h30—4~
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(1.o~i.o.t4o’partt .tnots; L)et wu:nto.i. to
44eafi1rH:o..
Whether counterpart funds contribute to economic
development in thefood recipient nations as alleged is
not a crucial question concerningthe creation and use
of the funds. Similar investments readily can be made
without the creation of counterpart funds. The hind
expenditures did not add to the nation’s stock of re-
sources, For example, if all counterpartfund accounts
were erased from the books of the Reserve Bank of
India and the U.S. Treasury, the purchases for which
the funds are used could be made by the Indian gov-
ernment through either the monetization of govern-
ment debt, the levying of taxes or both. These actions
could achieve the same results at no additional social
cost.
Since rupeeexpendituresfordevelopment purposes
or U.S. Department of Labor conferences could as
readily be made without the counterpart fund
accounts, the fund-creating feature of the program is
not a requisite. Consequently, the creation andspend-
ing of counterpart funds does not appear to be a pro-
ductive function. Such funds (new money or taxes)
could have been raised as readily without the currency
credits to the United States, Benefits from U.S. partic-
ipation in the programs would occuronly if U.S. parti-
cipants possess superior knowledge about develop-
ment techniques and of the special conditions in-
volved, neither of which is likely. Moreover, as indi-
cated earlier, many expenditures would not havebeen
made in the absence of counterpart funds, another
indication of their wasteful use.
Counterpartfund accounts appear to represent idle
resources abroad which, ifnot spent, would be wasted.
Yet, their expenditure represents the utilization ofreal
resources in the issuing nations. Further, it appears
that the value obtained from their use to the United
States frequently is less than the value of their use
foregone by the other countries involved.
(i.ONci SION
This article examines the results ofcrediting foreign
currencies to the United States in payment for P. L.
480 food shipments abroad. The greater portion of the
food shipments that led to the creation of these
accounts was a gift of consumer goods by the United
States to these nations.
The shipments provided additional net food re-
sources to therecipient countries and made some con-
tribution totheir welfare inthe short run. In tile longer
run, however, such gifts have an unfavorableimpact on
food production in the recipient nations. They affect
producers in the United States and in the food recip-
ient nations in opposite directions. Here, the govern-
ment purchases cause an increase in the price ofgrain
to producers and the price offood to consumers. U.S.
farmers are provided incentive tofurther increasepro-
duction. In contrast, the gift leads to lower prices for
farmers in the recipient nations and reduces their in-
centive to produce. As a result, the recipient nations
become even more dependent on the donor nations.
The nse of counterpart funds in the program was
predicated in part, on thebelief that foreign currency
credits are a vital factor in economic development in
the food-importing nations; this belief is an illusion.
The counterpartfund accounts currently on thecentral
bank books represent one way of initiating money
creation; however, governments always can create or
destroy money at their convenience. The use of coun-
terpart funds leads to an increase in thestock ofmoney
in these nations, not to an increase in resources or
production. Because the quantity and use of real re-
sources are importantfor development, resource use is
likely to be more efficiently achieved under a simpler
accounting system.
One solution would be simply to write off counter-
part hindsentirely and charge the expenditure instead
to foreign aid. With the exception ofthe small amount
ofexpenditure forembassy expense, etc., thefundsare
notpayments to the United States and have no impact
on the balance of payments. Both U.S. expenses and
money creation in the LDCs would be under better
control by writingoff such accountsand negotiatingthe
proportion of U.S. expenses offset by food shipments.
The importance ofassessing the impact of counter-
part hinds in the context of the current problem of
risingfood surpluses is thatit provides a reminder that
even ostensibly charitable actions have hidden and
unexpected impacts. Moreover, these unforeseen con-
sequences often are detrimental to the presumed pur-
poses of the program. The use ofcounterpart funds in
the context of reducing the U.S. food surplus by ship-
ping food to LDCs is such an example.
18